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This chapter continues and extends my work in bringing the modelling of SFL 
into the inter-disciplinary theorising of narrative. Previously I had suggested 
that the ‘worlds’ associated with the principal prototypical process choices of the 
Transitivity system (the physical world of doing, the world of consciousness of 
sensing, the world of abstract relations of being) could be related to different nar-
rative worlds/diegeses, and hence to choices of narrative diegesis and coherence 
dominant in different social and historical contexts (Huisman, 2002). ‘Diegesis’ 
is variously understood as ‘that which is told’ – for the novel, the fictional ‘reality’ 
that is perceived in the telling (Huisman, 2005: 18-19). Subsequently, however, I 
have brought this work into the context of contemporary theories of the plural-
ity of time, a context in which one can talk not only of different ‘narrative worlds’ 
but also of different ‘narrative temporalities’. 
J.T. Fraser, originally a physicist, and founder in 1966 of The International So-
ciety for the Study of Time, has developed a model of time in which time is not ‘a 
single unitary feature of the universe,’ not ‘an apparently homogenous universal 
aspect of nature.’ Rather, time is ‘a dynamic, developing, and open-ended hierar-
chy of temporalities,’ that is, ‘an evolutionary sequence of temporal levels associ-
ated with different natural worlds.’ (Fraser, 1982: 22 & 181) So, when we talk about 
time we need to be clear it is a term for a synthesis of temporalities, not reducible 
to one simple understanding. 
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Fraser gives ‘six integrative levels of nature’, as described by science and the 
social sciences. (The following account, including all brief quotations, is taken 
from Fraser, 1999: 21-43.) 
1. the world of electromagnetic radiation – the world of particles with zero rest-
mass, always on the move at the speed of light (theory of special relativity);
2.  the world of particle-waves, with non-zero mass, travelling at speeds less 
than that of light (quantum theory);
3.  the world of matter (general theory of relativity, or space-time theory); 
4.  the world of life, the organic world of living organisms, including humans; 
5.  the world of  the human mind – being human  as a species and as an indi-
vidual member of the species;
6.  the social world. 
Each of these worlds is associated with a particular type of causation and a quali-
tatively different temporality. 
For level 1, the form of causality is chaos and the form of temporality is at-
emporal. Fraser describes this as a world of ‘pure Heraclitean becoming’.  In the 
atemporal world of an object travelling at the speed of light, everything happens 
at once.
For level 2, the form of causality is statistical, that is, the laws of causation are 
probabilistic. This form of temporality Fraser labels prototemporal;  proto- signi-
fies ‘first in a series’ and Fraser refers to this as ‘the most primitive form of time’. 
In a prototemporal world, instants happen only statistically – it is not possible 
to point to the instant when something happened. (For example, the half-life of 
radio-active cobalt 60 is 5.3 years; after that time close to half an initial amount 
will have decayed, but it is impossible to tell when the next decay particle will ap-
pear, or which particle it will be.)
For level 3, the form of causality is deterministic and the form of temporality 
Fraser labels eotemporal (from Eos, the Greek goddess of the dawn). Eotemporal-
ity is the oldest form of continuous time and eotemporal events can be counted 
and ordered – this is the time signified by ‘t’ in a physicist’s formula – but such 
observation will depend on the location of the observer.  One implication is that 
the concept of present comes into being only at the next, organic, level 4.
For level 4, the form of causality is ‘short-term intentionality in the service of 
organic needs’ and the form of temporality is biotemporal. Biotemporality is the 
temporal world ‘of living organisms, including humans, as far as their biologi-
cal functions go’. With life comes the possibility of needs, and hence the organic 
present, in which those needs are experienced.
For level 5, the form of causality is long term intentionality in the service of 
distant, often symbolic goals, and the form of temporality Fraser labels noot-
emporal (from Greek noos – mind or thought). He describes the temporal world 
which is unique to the human mind as ‘a time informed of a sharp division be-
tween future and past, or long-term expectation and memory, and of a mental 
present with continuously changing boundaries.’ For Fraser, the noetic world ‘is 
created by our capacity to produce symbolic transformations of experience and 
then manipulate them as part and parcel of reality.’
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For level 6, the form of causality is ‘social intentionality’ or ‘historical causa-
tion’ and the form of temporality is sociotemporal. Sociotemporality is ‘the way 
a culture represents time’; it is ‘a social consensus necessary for the survival of a 
society, a definition of that society’s way of being.’ 
Turning now to my use of Fraser’s model for the study of narrative, I suggest 
we can describe the six integrative levels of nature, with their associated causal-
ity and temporality, as six types of world (diegesis), in each of which a different 
type of story can  be told:
Level 1: chaotic, atemporal a world/ a story of becoming
Level 2: statistical, prototemporal a world/ a story of possibility
Level 3: deterministic, eotemporal a world/ a story of located being in space/time
Level 4: short-term intention, biotemporal a world / a story of organic being/ life
Level 5: long-term intention, nootemporal a world / a story of human individual life
Level 6: social intention, sociotemporal a world /a story of human social life
From the point of view of physics, as Fraser puts it, this is a ‘hierarchically nested 
and evolutionarily open system along a scale of increasing complexity’ – that is, 
the world of electromagnetic radiation preceded and is implicit in the world of 
heavy matter, such as stars and solar systems. However, from the point of view 
of human existence, all these worlds co-exist. ‘As a living, thinking and social be-
ing made of matter, each person shares some of the potentialities and all of the 
restraints of these organizational levels.’ (Fraser, 1999:28)
Yet while, as human beings, we are aware of our experience of the last three 
worlds - our experience of physical/physiological, mental and social life - our 
human awareness of the evolutionary earlier worlds is very recent, achieved 
through the use of mathematics and technology. Relevant here is the concept of a 
species’ ‘umwelt’  developed by the biologist Jakob von Uexküll, now also used in 
other disciplines: ‘the circumscribed portion of the environment which is mean-
ingful and effective for a given species.’ (Fraser, 1999: 23) Associated with this 
concept is the ‘extended umwelt principle’, which is relevant to the way humans 
extend the meaningfulness of their environment through the use of mathemat-
ics and technology1.  So Fraser’s worlds 4, 5 and 6 and their associated temporali-
ties constitute the umwelt of natural human experience, while worlds 1, 2 and 3 
and their associated temporalities constitute the extended human umwelt. This 
distinction proves to be significant for the theorising of ideational meaning in 
SFL and, in particular, for the experiential meaning choices of the Transitivity 
system.  The remainder of this chapter now explores this significance. 
In Construing Experience through Meaning (1999), Halliday and Matthiessen 
describe how the language function of ‘construing experience’ constructs the 
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‘ideation base’. ‘By virtue of its unique properties as a stratified semiotic system, 
language is able to transform experience into meaning.’ (p xi) or again (with the 
authors’ italics), ‘experience is the reality that we construe for ourselves by means of 
language.’ (p 3) Their account implies a direction of modelling: ‘in modelling the 
meaning base we are building it ‘upwards’ from the grammar.’ (p 2) This direc-
tion contrasts with that of the more usual assumption, in cognitive science, of 
a knowledge base, in which prior knowing of concepts and categories is used to 
interpret experience.
Beginning then with the grammar of the clause, in the choices of Transitivity, 
SFL builds upwards to the construal of ideational meaning and thence to experi-
ence, the construed reality. This is represented graphically in colour on the cover 
of the second edition of Halliday’s Introduction to Functional Grammar (1994), and 
in black and white in both this edition (p 108) and the third edition (Halliday & 
Mathiesssen, 2004: 172). Permission to reproduce the latter, below, by the editors 
is acknowledged with thanks.
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In both editions, this Transitivity diagram is labelled: ‘The grammar of experi-
ence: types of process in English.’ The third edition adds that a sphere, rather than 
the two dimensional circle of the printed page, would be a more accurate graphic 
metaphor, representing the process type as a ‘semiotic space’: the significant as-
pect is the ‘loop’ rather than linear relation of the process types, together with the 
fuzzy indeterminacy between them. Nevertheless, ‘the regions have core areas 
and these represent prototypical  members of the process types.’ (2004: 172) The 
two-dimensional colour diagram on the cover of the second edition is able to rep-
resent both core areas and intermediate fuzziness with a circular spectrum: the 
prototypical material, relational and mental processes are represented by the pri-
mary colours red, yellow and blue respectively, and the intermediate processes 
by the secondary or blended colours of orange (existential), green (verbal) and 
purple (behavioural). Construing upwards from the grammar, ‘clauses of differ-
ent process types … make distinctive contributions to the construal of experience 
in text,’ so that ‘part of the “flavour” of a particular text, and also of the register 
that it belongs to, lies in its mixture of process types.’ (2004: 174) From the Tran-
sitivity diagram, it is clear that, from the choices of Transitivity, the experience 
construed may be of the physical world of doing, or of the world of consciousness 
of sensing, or of the world of abstract relations of being. Each of these worlds is 
construed from a prototypical process (as the physical world from material proc-
esses, the world of abstract relations from relational processes, the world of con-
sciousness from mental processes) and its construal is augmented by aspects of 
the adjacent ‘fuzzy’ process (as, for example, the physical world by behavioural 
processes, or the world of abstract relations by verbal processes). The world of 
abstract relations can be understood as the social world, that which is construed 
through the semiotic understanding of attributes, identities and symbolic rela-
tions. Thus, from the perspective of the upwards direction model described by 
Halliday and Mathiessen, physical experience, conscious experience and social 
experience are the reality that we construe for ourselves by means of language. 
If we now compare the prototypical divisions (into physical, conscious and 
social experience) of Halliday and Matthiessen’s model with the last three tem-
poralities of Fraser’s model, it turns out (unsurprisingly) that the Transitivity sys-
tem in English has evolved to enable us to construe the umwelt of our everyday 
experience. In summary we have:
–  Fraser’s level 4 comparable to Halliday’s physical world of doing: a world / 
a story of life, the world of physical/physiological experience, the organic 
world of living organisms, including humans;
–  Fraser’s level 5 comparable to Halliday’s world of consciousness of sensing: 
a world / a story of the human mind, the world of psychological experience 
or consciousness, being human as a species and as an individual member 
of the species;
–  Fraser’s level 6 comparable to Halliday’s world of abstract relations of be-
ing: a world /a story of human social life, the world of social relations, be-
ing human as a member of a particular society.
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However, the Transitivity system has not evolved in natural language to enable 
us to construe the extended umwelt, the worlds of Einsteinean physics, for which 
mathematics is the necessary language.  As earlier remarked, from the point of 
view of human existence all six integrative levels of nature co-exist, but only the 
last three are construed as co-existing reality from the point of view of  human 
semiosis in natural language. 
The relevance of all this to narrative study is the following: that though ‘nar-
rative’ has been variously understood as a textual or discursive category, the con-
cept of ‘time’ has been universally assumed to be central to its study. (For a brief 
account of approaches to narrative theory in different disciplines, see Martin 
Cortazzi, 1993.) For example, the socio-linguistic study of narrative as genre or 
text-type has elaborated on William’s Labov’s seminal work and temporal mean-
ing was central to Labov’s linguistic definition of narrative: ‘a minimal narrative 
is defined as one containing a single temporal juncture,’ that is, ‘a change in the 
order of two clauses will result in a change in the temporal sequence of the origi-
nal semantic interpretation.’ (Labov, 1972: 360-1) SFL (Sydney School) work on 
narrative developed out of this tradition. Thus, in his discussion of genre, J. R. 
Martin cites the work of R. E. Longacre, the anthropological linguist: Longacre 
uses a dichotomy of plus or minus chronological framework to contrast narra-
tive and drama with the expository genre (Martin, 1992, 560-1, principally from 
Longacre, 1976). And I could continue citing amply from other disciplinary stud-
ies, in which, though narrative is understood as discourse rather than genre, 
time is again central to any definition of narrative. For example, for Paul Ricoeur, 
‘Time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner 
of narrative; narrative in turn is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the 
features of temporal existence.’ (Ricoeur, 1984: 3) Again, more recently, H. Porter 
Abbott, answering the question what narrative does for us, writes ‘narrative is the 
principal way in which our species organizes its understanding of time.’ (Porter 
Abbott, 2002: 3) Compare Halliday & Mathiessen’s comment, previously quoted: 
‘experience is the reality that we construe for ourselves by means of language.’ (1999: 3) 
Translating Porter Abbott’s words, we could roughly paraphrase: the human ex-
perience of time is the reality that we construe for ourselves by means of narra-
tive discourse, telling stories. 
These various theorisings of the time/narrative relation beg the question 
of what is understood by ‘time’.  Given that language construes experience, it is 
tempting to presume that a singular noun represents a singular entity and this 
has been the usual presumption. A dual concept of time has sometimes been 
entertained: for example, the early twentieth century French philosopher Henri 
Bergson distinguished the sequential or quantitative concept of time from our 
lived or qualitative experience of time, which he called duration. (Bergson, 1913)2 
However, given the dimensions of experience usually studied in the humanities 
and social sciences (typically those of Fraser’s levels 4, 5 and 6), it is unsurprising 
that the complex temporalities of modern physics have not been written into 
the theories of those disciplines.  In particular, the structuralist study of narra-
tive known as narratology (still very influential in some  circles) has assumed a 
singular understanding of time, and differentiated between ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ 
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structure by that criterion. It theorised a (usually) dual relation between the ‘sur-
face’ telling or discourse of the narrative and an ‘underlying’ story, an inferred 
structure with the events in chronological order. (I give a summary account of 
different literary theories of narrative in Huisman, 2005: 28-44. ) Like the chron-
ological ordering of Longacre, cited by Martin, the ‘story’ of narratology exhibits 
the sequence associated with only one of the temporal worlds of physics - Fraser’s 
world 4 and Halliday’s semiotic world of physical experience. This is the world of 
biotemporality, of chronological sequence, in which I cannot drink water from 
the glass until I have raised the glass to my lips. But, as we have seen, there are 
other worlds, and other temporalities.
What are the theoretical consequences of importing the several temporalities 
and the ‘upwards’ construal of experience into the understanding of narrative?
First, different temporalities are associated with differently perceived coher-
ence in a narrative sequence. As narrative is dependent on the symbolic organi-
zation of some semiotic modality, such as language or image or dance, or their 
multimodal intersemiosis, it could not originate until the physical/physiologi-
cal, mental and social levels of humans had evolved. From the earliest oral narra-
tives, all the six temporal levels had evolved, although construed human experi-
ence in natural language is an experience only of the last three worlds. In general, 
then, a narrative told through language will be told with all types of process, that 
is, will allow the overlapping construal of a physical world, a world of conscious-
ness, a world of abstract relations. One of these worlds may well dominate the 
narrative; in fact, it can now be seen that those studies of narrative which assume 
a monovalent time, equivalent to the biotemporality of level 4, have assumed 
the dominance of the representation of organic physical experience (the world 
of level 4), or even, albeit unintentionally, that narrative is the representation of 
that world. (The latter is a downwards analysis, in contrast to the direction of Hal-
liday & Matthiesssen’s analysis of construal.) Chronological sequence is ‘natural’ 
to that organic world - you must walk up to a door before it is possible for you 
to walk through it - but other temporal worlds may be characterised by differ-
ent concepts of what constitutes narrative sequence. For example, the perceived 
coherent sequence for the world of consciousness, level 5, is that of individual 
association, as in individual memory or expectation and imagination. Again, the 
perceived coherent sequence for the world of abstract relations, level 6, the world 
of being and sociotemporality, is that of equation, of equative relations between 
what is construed as socially like or unlike.
In summary, the following table gives the six different types of story, inferred 
from Fraser’s model, each projecting a particular type of world, with its own char-
acteristic sequence, or mode of coherence, associated with its different type of 
temporality.
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type of world story of … mode of coherence
1. chaotic becoming incoherent sequence
2. uncertain possibility indeterminate sequence
3. material being reversible sequence
4. organic life chronological sequence
5. mental human individual life associative sequence
6. social human social life equative sequence
Second,  the dominance of different temporalities can be characterised as an his-
torical phenomenon. As already intimated, the extended human umwelt, that is, 
the awareness, the progressive inclusion, of the evolutionary earlier, first three 
levels in the human understanding of reality (whether in academic disciplines 
or popular journalism), has come about comparatively recently, through the de-
velopments of mathematics and technology. Such understanding, variously dis-
persed through a century of two world wars and the global communication of in-
stability, feeds into that ‘poetics of indeterminacy,’ to use the phrase of American 
critic Marjorie Perloff, which is also sometimes referred to as ‘postmodernism’. 
(Perloff, 1981) This history has resulted in, I am suggesting, an inverse relation 
between natural evolution (as described by Fraser’s levels) and the development 
of Western literary narrative. Nature has evolved in a direction of apparent so-
lidity and community. Western literary narrative has developed towards telling 
stories of evanescent becoming, of a chaotic world with incoherent sequence. 
A fuller exploration of this large topic must be presented elsewhere, but the 
following remarks attempt a brief general introduction. 
It was an initial research concern with Old English narrative which led me 
to a dissatisfaction with available narrative theory and which suggested to me 
the possible relevance of the SFL model. In the Old English poem, Beowulf, for 
example, social space is important, rather than specific physical space with its 
temporal location. The narrative typically emphasises not what goes after what 
– the chronology of narratology – but what is similar to or different from what: 
social relations of attribution (‘that was a good king/ bad king’) and identity (in 
terms of social role or genealogy). Here I saw the dominance of SFL’s world of 
abstract relations, the world which I now understand as comparable to Fraser’s 
social world of level 6. This world contrasts with both the physical/external 
world of chronological sequence, experienced by the individual organism (level 
4), and the mental/internal world of associative sequence, experienced by the 
individual human (level 5), in that it is construed socially, rather than individu-
ally. Its sociotemporality is the historical understanding of its people (includ-
ing its explanatory myths), where events possibly widely separated in physical 
time but perceived as socially related can be juxtaposed in equative sequence. I 
suggest that early pre-printing narratives primarily tell such social stories. The 
simplest examples, as in traditional folk and fairy tales, lend themselves to the 
kind of reductive functional analysis made of Russian tales by Vladimir Propp in 
1928: a finite list of events, and a finite number of social roles, seven in Propp’s 
dramatis personae. (Propp, 1968)  (Mikhail Bakhtin’s studies of the ‘chronotope’ in 
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classical and early medieval texts illustrate the late emergence of the ‘individual’, 
as opposed to the social type3).  But stories dominated by sociotemporality can 
be extremely complex, as I discuss elsewhere for the Old English poem, Beowulf 
(Huisman, 2008a). 
The growth of the novel in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has 
been well documented, together with the social and economic changes of that 
period. (Moretti , 2006: 429-520) The increased emphasis on the individual and 
the possibilities and causes of personal success or failure in society means that 
the organic/external and mental/internal worlds of the individual human being 
(worlds 4 and 5) are given more attention in relation to the social story. Thus the 
early post-printing novels are often focused on the personal history of a particu-
lar individual and titled by the name of that individual – think of Defoe’s Moll 
Flanders (1722), Fielding’s Tom Jones (1729). 
As a further development, compare the more complex overlapping texture of 
the classic realist novels of the nineteenth century, whether third person narra-
tion with an omniscient narrator (as with George Eliot’s Middlemarch, 1871-2) or 
first person narration by a character (as with Charles Dickens’ David Copperfield, 
1850). Their dense texture derives from a tight integration of the temporalities 
of the last three worlds. The integration of the organic and mental temporalities 
gives the illusion of a psychologically ‘real’ character: with organic temporality 
the narrative tells a story which moves chronologically with its principal charac-
ter; with mental temporality the narrative tells a psychological story of the char-
acter’s thoughts and feelings about the organic present, with associated memo-
ries of the past and expectations of the future linked to the narrative present. 
Simultaneously the sequential narrative path of this character is situated in a 
particular and explicitly detailed social context, in the historical temporality of 
a particular social positioning, with the equative coherence of explicit social val-
ues (as, for example, in the indexical roles of clothes and manners).
Newtonian physics, operating as it does in the constant gravitational en-
vironment of the earth, seemed to confirm rather than trouble the integrated 
temporal coherence of the nineteenth century classic realist novel. However the 
revised scientific notions of space/time gaining currency at the beginning of 
the twentieth century began to extend the cultural umwelt. Thus the Newtonian 
objective universe turns out to be an Einsteinian one of subjectively positioned 
measurement. In so-called modernist narrative, this extended human umwelt 
undermines the narrative confluence of subjective personal experience and ob-
jective social reality. The modernist novel of the early twentieth century appears 
to be more dominated by the associative coherence of world 5, that of conscious-
ness - think of the narrative sequence of individual association in the writing of 
Proust, of James Joyce, of Virginia Woolf. In practice, it was the growing aware-
ness of the physicist’s world 3, the contingent relation of location in time and 
space, associated with the determined but not fixed eotemporality, which in-
fluenced these more subjective narratives. The inter-relation of science, art and 
literature in the early twentieth century is much written on, as in, for example, 
Vargish & Mook (1999), Schleifer, (2000), Whitworth (2001).
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The modernist novel still maintains an integration of the organic and men-
tal worlds, the worlds of a human as living organism and thinking individual, 
that is, the integrity of the individual character in the novel is not under threat. 
However, those narratives which have been labelled ‘postmodern’ can bring dis-
ruption into every aspect identified as ‘being’ in the classic realist or modernist 
narrative, attempting to invoke the temporalities and causalities of the first two 
worlds of the extended umwelt. Postmodern novels typically exhibit some proto- 
or even a-temporality, the temporalities of worlds 2 and 1, the uncertain and cha-
otic worlds told of in stories of possibility and becoming: they tell stories with 
instability in the identity of any of the traditional narrative conventions of plot, 
character, event and setting4. The work of Thomas Pynchon is often cited here. 
(In the Names Index of the edited collection, Postmodernism and the Contemporary 
Novel, Nicol, 2002, Thomas Pynchon appears more frequently than any other au-
thor.)
In Huisman (2008b), I presented detailed comparative analyses of excerpts 
from Eliot’s Middlemarch, Woolf ’s To the Lighthouse and Pynchon’s The Crying of 
Lot 49. I chose extracts from the three novels which appeared to have something 
in common: each told how an event was associated with a particular emotion. 
The classic realist Middlemarch and the modernist To the Lighthouse did not make 
identical use of association but both did however establish some association (in 
Middlemarch, how a particular emotion becomes permanently associated with a 
particular event, in To the Lighthouse, how a particular event or object becomes 
permanently associated with a particular emotion). But it was not so for Pyn-
chon’s postmodern novel. In my analysis of The Crying of Lot 49, I showed how 
the work describes a failure of association, even when it is desired. Thus, in the 
following excerpt, the character Oedipa tries to hold on to a specific emotion, so 
that in future she can interpret all experience through it (see the endnote for the 
full paragraph from which this excerpt is taken5):
For a moment she’d wondered if the seal around her sockets were tight enough to al-
low the tears simply to go on and fill up the entire lens space and never dry. She could 
carry the sadness of the moment with her that way forever, see the world refracted 
through those tears, those specific tears, as if indices as yet unfound varied in impor-
tant ways from cry to cry. (Pynchon, 1990: 21)
Yet we see (as I previously wrote) that Oedipa’s desire is self contradictory, in 
terms of the three worlds of everyday human experience (Fraser’s 4, 5 and 6): to 
carry the sadness ‘of the moment’ with her ‘for ever’, to allow the tears to ‘never 
dry’, and a desire to escape the incomprehensible world of unpredictable ‘indices 
as yet unfound’ (Fraser’s worlds 1 and 2?)  into - what? Like Oedipa, the reader will 
not, by the end of the novel, ‘find out’.  (Huisman, 2008b: 77-8) 
Huisman (2008b) also includes detailed grammatical analysis of the ideation-
al choices (experiential and logical) in this text, with the aim of demonstrating 
the use of natural language, language which evolved to construe human physical, 
mental and social experience, to (attempt to) tell stories outside the experience 
of that evolution. I repeat here just my analysis of the last sentence (again from 
Pynchon’s paragraph in endnote v):
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To make sense of C3, we infer a being process: ‘what else is there?’ (an Existential rather 
than Relational process), but the narrator has withheld our explicit reading of such a 
clause. Existential processes - something exists - are the prerequisite for Relational 
processes, a relation between things, or things and their attributes. Relational proc-
esses are those systemic linguistics associates with the world of abstract relations, 
comparable to Fraser’s world 6 of sociotemporality. Without ‘is’, no existents, and 
no relations between existents, are determinable, from any point of view. The narra-
tive takes Oedipa, and the reader, into worlds 1 and 2, where natural language cannot 
speak. The final sentences of this paragraph move through Oedipa’s mental processes 
to the collapse of language, a chaotic world with no differentiated existence, no escape 
into specific meaningfulness. (Huisman 2008b: 77)
In summary, this chapter has argued for the complementary relation of the SFL 
modelling of ideational meaning and experienced worlds with Fraser’s account 
of temporalities, derived from the modelling of evolutionary worlds in physics. 
The experience construed by natural language, via the possible choices of the 
Transitivity system, is that of the natural human umwelt, a reality of overlapping 
physical/physiological, mental and social worlds. Yet physics, in its language of 
mathematics, construes an extended human umwelt, a reality of the worlds of 
chaos, probability, relativity. How can natural language construe the experience 
of those worlds? I have suggested that, given that narrative discourse, telling sto-
ries, has been the human way to construe temporal relations, narrative has been 
further deployed in an effort to tell stories of these newly understood worlds, to 
construe the experience of their un-earthly temporalities. To what extent this can 
successfully be achieved is a matter for critical debate, and the literary tolerance 
of individual readers.
Finally, for SFL, this account argues for its potentially greater relevance to the 
modelling of narrative, claiming that SFL can make a larger contribution to the 
theorising of narrative and temporality than has previously been recognised. (In 
a more limited use in SFL, from the socio-linguistic tradition, the term ‘narrative’ 
has been used merely to name a genre; a text of the genre ‘narrative’ differs in 
structure from texts of other genres such as recount and procedure6).  At least, this 
account describes how SFL modelling of Transitivity contributes to the critique of 
In the final sentence of this paragraph, also the final sentence of the chapter, the im-
possibility of successful interpretation is made clear. Oedipa the character - and the 
reader, who is following a similar trajectory to Oedipa - cannot reach a conclusive un-
derstanding of the experienced worlds. 
C1 /If the tower is everywhere, / C1 enhancement, condition: positive, RELATIONAL
C2 /and (if) the knight of deliverance (is) no proof against its magic, 
                   / C2 paratactic extension RELATIONAL 
C3 /what else …? / C3 independent /    (Pynchon, 1990: 22)
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the mono-temporal approach of several disciplines in the humanities and social 
sciences, including narratology and socio-linguistics. At most, it suggests how 
SFL can contribute to the very modelling of narrative, in its upward construal of 
different worlds and their temporalities.
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1 Umwelt as ‘the circumscribed por-
tion of the environment which 
is meaningful and effective for a 
given species’ is quoted by Fraser 
(1999: 23) from English & Champ-
ney English (1964), s.v. ‘Umwelt’. 
The term has a wide currency in 
Peircean semiotics, as in Deely 
(1990: 59-62).Fraser continues: 
«The extension of von Uexküll’s 
umwelt principle to worlds we 
know only through instruments 
or formulas is the extended umwelt 
principle. …Philosophers have long 
sought normative criteria for a cat-
egorical definition of reality. For 
our purpose all that is necessary 
and sufficient is to have established 
a working concept of reality – the 
extended umwelt principle – and 
to note that as our knowledge of the 
world expands, so does our reality. 
This amounts to equating episte-
mology with ontology: the world is 
the way we find it to be through the 
many forms of human knowledge, 
even if some of its features appear 
to be counterintuitive».   (1999: 25) 
Contemporary literary studies at-
tempt to express similar notions: 
for example, McHale (1987) links 
modernism to the disruption of 
epistemology, but postmodernism 
to the disruption of ontology. 
2 Bergson is currently enjoying a re-
vival of interest in the humanities. 
The French philosopher Gilles De-
leuze’s use of Bergson’s work has in 
turn been taken up by, for example, 
the Australian philosopher Eliza-
beth Grosz in two recent books, The 
Nick of Time (2004) and Time Travels 
(2005). See also endnote iv, below.
3 From the 1930s, using his concept 
of the chronotope, Bakhtin studied 
Greek, Roman and medieval narra-
tives to identify precursors of the 
printed novel. (Clark and Holquist, 
1984: 275-94) It would be interest-
ing to correlate Bakhtin’s account 
with Fraser’s last three levels, those 
of the biotemporal, nootemporal 
and sociotemporal worlds. Bakhtin 
identifies three major types of nar-
rative, the last having what he calls 
‘biographical time’; of the seven 
sub-types of the latter, only three 
appear to intimate or include sto-
ries of nootemporality, the mental 
world. As Clark and Holquist re-
mark, ‘These works give the first 
inklings of the authentically soli-
tary individual who first makes an 
appearance in the Middle Ages.’ 
(pp 286-7) Bakhtin’s concept of the 
chronotope emerged in the same 
intellectual context as the modern-
ist novels; it was ‘a unit for study-
ing texts according to the ratio and 
nature of the temporal and spatial 
categories represented’ (p 278), and 
arose through the scientific theoris-
ing of space/time relativity. 
4 ‘Becoming’ is a concept with legs, 
especially in twentieth century 
European philosophy. In her in-
troduction to the book, Becomings 
(a collection by different authors), 
the editor Elizabeth Grosz writes: ‘… 
[this collection] explicitly focuses 
on and develops out of the work of 
a privileged few who have insisted 
on the fundamental openness of 
time to futurity - who have resisted 
all attempts to reduce time to the 
workings of causality, and who 
have seen in it the force of becom-
ing - Nietzche, Bergson, and De-
leuze … Others could be considered 
philosophers of becoming, among 
them Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
Derrida, Foucault, Klossowski, and 
Irigaray.’ (1999: 3) My critical com-
ment on Grosz’s discussion is that 
there is a danger of again reducing 
time to one temporality, that of be-
coming. The advantage of Fraser’s 
model is its open and evolutionary 
understanding of time, including 
but not limited to the atemporality 
of becoming. 
5 The extract is the closing para-
graph of Chapter 1. (Pynchon, 1990: 
20-22). 
(‘She’ is the young woman Oedipa, 
who at the beginning of the novel 
receives a letter telling her she has 
been named executor of the estate 
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of her ex-lover, Pierce Inverarity. 
She has by this time married Mu-
cho, a disk jockey.) Mental proc-
esses are in bold/underlined.
«As things developed, she was to 
have all manner of revelations. 
Hardly about Pierce Inverarity, or 
herself; but about what remained 
yet had somehow, before this, 
stayed away. There had hung the 
sense of buffering, insulation, she 
had noticed the absence of an in-
tensity, as if watching a movie, 
just perceptibly out of focus, that 
the projectionist refused to fix. 
And had also gently conned herself 
into the curious, Rapunzel-like role 
of a pensive girl somehow, magi-
cally, prisoner among the pines 
and salt fogs of Kinnaret, looking 
for somebody to say hey, let down 
your hair. When it turned out to 
be Pierce she’d happily pulled out 
the pins and curlers and down it 
tumbled in its whispering, dainty 
avalanche, only when Pierce had 
got maybe halfway up, her lovely 
hair turned, through some sinister 
sorcery, into a great unanchored 
wig, and down he fell, on his ass. 
But dauntless, perhaps using one 
of his many credit cards for a shim, 
he’d slipped the lock on her tower 
door and come up the conchlike 
stairs, which, had true guile come 
more naturally to him, he’d have 
done to begin with. But all that had 
then gone on between them had re-
ally never escaped the confinement 
of that tower. In Mexico City they 
somehow wandered into an exhi-
bition of paintings by the beautiful 
Spanish exile Remedios Varo: in the 
central painting of a triptych, titled 
‘Bordando el Manto Terrestre,’ were 
a number of frail girls with heart-
shaped faces, huge eyes, spun-gold 
hair, prisoners in the top room of a 
circular tower, embroidering a kind 
of tapestry which spilled out the slit 
windows and into a void, seeking 
hopelessly to fill the void: for all the 
other buildings and creatures, all 
the waves, ships and forests of the 
earth were contained in their tapes-
try, and the tapestry was the world. 
Oedipa, perverse, had stood in front 
of the painting and cried. No one 
had noticed; she wore dark green 
bubble shades. For a moment she’d 
wondered if the seal around her 
sockets were tight enough to allow 
the tears simply to go on and fill up 
the entire lens space and never dry. 
She could carry the sadness of the 
moment with her that way forever, 
see the world refracted through 
those tears, those specific tears, as 
if indices as yet unfound varied in 
important ways from cry to cry. She 
had looked down at her feet and 
known, then, because of a paint-
ing, that what she stood on had 
only been woven together a couple 
thousand miles away in her own 
tower, was only by accident known 
as Mexico, and so Pierce had taken 
her away from nothing, there’d 
been no escape. What did she so 
desire escape from? Such a captive 
maiden, having plenty of time to 
think, soon realizes that her tower, 
its height and architecture, are like 
her ego only incidental: that what 
really keeps her where she is is 
magic, anonymous and malignant, 
visited on her from outside and for 
no reason at all. Having no appara-
tus except gut fear and female cun-
ning to examine this formless mag-
ic, to understand how it works, how 
to measure its field strength, count 
its lines of force, she may fall back 
on superstition, or take up a useful 
hobby like embroidery, or go mad, 
or marry a disk jockey. If the tower 
is everywhere, and the knight of 
deliverance no proof against its 
magic, what else?». 
6 See, for example, Butt, Fahey, 
Feez, Spinks & Yallop (2000: 9-14) 
This use of the term ‘narrative’ as 
‘genre’ limits the relevance of SFL to 
other disciplinary studies.  In con-
trast, using the semiotic/semantic 
understanding of the term ‘narra-
tive’, as in this paper, extends the 
possible relevance of SFL model-
ling;  Huisman (2007), for example, 
suggests such an extension to nar-
rative semiosis in different media.
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